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Título: Números y conocimiento previo en comprensión de frases. 
Resumen: Evaluamos si la comprensión de frases que contenían informa-
ción numérica se beneficiaría de la presentación de números en formato 
arábigo y del uso del conocimiento previo. Los participantes leyeron frases 
que incluían números (dígitos arábigos o palabras numéricas) mientras se 
evaluaba la precisión de la comprensión. Además, las frases estaban sesga-
das o no-sesgadas por el conocimiento previo de las personas sobre canti-
dades. Los resultados mostraron mejor comprensión de frases que conten-
ían dígitos arábigos frente a palabras numéricas. Además, las frases segadas 
se comprendieron más precisamente que las frases no-sesgadas. Estos re-
sultados indican que la información sobre magnitud en el contexto de frase 
se comprende mejor cuando las cantidades se presentan en formato arábigo 
y cuando están asociadas al conocimiento del mundo de los participantes.   
Palabras clave: Conocimiento previo; comprensión de frases; procesa-
miento numérico. 
  Abstract: We evaluated whether the comprehension of sentences that con-
tained numerical information could benefit from presenting numbers in 
Arabic format and from using prior knowledge. Participants read sentences 
including numbers (Arabic digits or number words) while the comprehen-
sion accuracy was evaluated. In addition, the sentences were biased or un-
biased by people’s prior knowledge about quantities. The results showed 
better comprehension for sentences that contained Arabic digits as com-
pared to number words. Moreover, biased sentences were understood 
more accurately than unbiased sentences. These results indicate that infor-
mation about magnitude in sentence context is comprehended better when 
quantities are presented in Arabic format and when they are associated 
with participants’ world knowledge. 





There is abundant research in numerical cognition focused 
on the comprehension of numbers (e.g., Macizo & Herrera, 
2008; Nöel & Seron, 1992; Serrano & Pons, 2008). These 
studies have evaluated the way people understand numbers 
with tasks that require the access to magnitude information 
(e.g., number comparison task in which participants decided 
the larger of two numbers). One basic finding obtained in 
this field is that number comprehension depends on the 
format in which numbers are presented (Macizo & Herrera, 
2008). There is evidence indicating that semantic representa-
tion of numbers is activated whenever digits or number 
words are encountered (e.g., Ischebeck, 2003). However, 
there is evidence also that the access to semantic informa-
tion is more accurate for Arabic digits (e.g., 21) than for 
number words (e.g., twenty-one). For example, people 
commit fewer errors in the Arabic number comparison task 
than in the verbal number comparison task (e.g., 4.6% and 
6.1% respectively; Macizo & Herrera, 2008). The Arabic 
format is more simple and is used more frequently than the 
word-numeral system (Hurford, 1987), which might deter-
mine the easy to process digits as compared to number 
words. 
In the majority of studies, number comprehension has 
been addressed in the absence of linguistic context although 
in real life numbers are usually immersed in rich linguistic 
contexts, for example, during the course of reading. To our 
knowledge, the easy to process Arabic numbers as compared 
to verbal number words has not been evaluated in context. 
How numerical information should be presented to improve 
reading comprehension? The first goal of this paper ad-
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dressed this question. We evaluated whether numerical in-
formation in sentence context was better understood when 
it was presented in Arabic format as compared to verbal 
format. 
The second aim of this study was to investigate whether 
the understanding of sentences with numerical information 
could benefit from the use of people’s world knowledge. In 
the field of psycholinguistic research there is evidence that 
people use their knowledge of common events or situations 
in the world as they read texts, sentences and single words 
(Hare, Jones, Thomson, Kelly, & McRae, 2009; McKoon & 
Ratfcliff, 2005; Vu, Kellas, Petersen, & Metcalf, 2003). 
Moreover, a variety of results demonstrates that activation 
of prior knowledge improves reading comprehension 
(Kintsch & Franzke, 1995). Kintsch and Franzke showed 
the necessity of prior knowledge for constructing a compre-
hensive representation of the reading. Readers without that 
prior knowledge could not make correct elaborative infer-
ences, resulting in poorer understanding. 
Related to magnitude processing, people have prior 
knowledge that helps them to mentally compare how tall, 
large, expensive, etc. things are in real life. For example, 
people tend to think that something made of gold is more 
expensive that something made of copper; however it might 
not be the case. Although world knowledge has been widely 
studied, we are not aware of any study investigating whether 
prior knowledge modulates the understanding of sentences 
that contain numerical information. 
Summarizing, the present study aimed to answer two 
empirical questions. Firstly, in which format should numbers 
be presented to facilitate readers’ comprehension? Second, 
would people’s world knowledge facilitate the understanding 
of sentences with numerical information? In the study, par-
ticipants read sentences that contained numbers (Arabic dig-
its or number words) and, afterward, they completed a com-
prehension task to evaluate the sentence understanding. If 
the easy to process Arabic digits observed in the number 
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comparison task (e.g., Macizo & Herrera, 2008) extend to 
number processing in context, we might find a better under-
standing of sentences with digits. Otherwise, number format 
(Arabic digits and number words) might not determine per-
formance. In addition, some sentences were constructed so 
people’s prior knowledge biased them toward the same in-
terpretation as that associated to the literal meaning from 
comparing the two numbers in the sentence. If participants’ 
prior knowledge facilitates number processing in context, 
they might show enhanced understanding of biased sen-






Sixty-four students at the University of Granada (53 
women, 11 men) participated in the experiment for course 
credits. All were native speakers of Spanish. They reported 
no history of language or numerical disabilities. Their mean 
age was 22.23 years (SD = 4.76). Four participants were left-
handed, 60 were right-handed and all had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal visual acuity. The participants were as-
signed randomly to the Arabic digits condition (n = 32) and 
to the Number words condition (n = 32). The participants 
gave written consent to participate before the experiment. 
 
Design and Materials 
 
A 2 x 2 mixed design was used with Number format 
(Arabic digits vs. number words) as a between-subjects 
(within-items) variable and Prior knowledge (biased vs. un-
biased sentences) as a within-subjects (within-items) variable. 
Eighty real-life situations were selected to compose the 
experimental sentences. These sentences contained two 
numbers. The numerical variables were controlled across the 
experimental sentences: Half of the sentences contained 
three-digit numbers (e.g., one hundred twenty-one) and the 
rest contained two-digit numbers (e.g., twenty-one). The two 
numbers embedded in each sentence had the same number 
of digits (two or three digits). The numerical distance be-
tween the two numbers in each sentence ranged from 1 (e.g., 
twenty-one vs. twenty-two) to 8 (e.g., twenty-one vs. twenty-
nine). Half of the sentences included within-decade com-
parisons (e.g., twenty-one vs. twenty-four) while the rest of 
sentences included between-decade comparisons (e.g., 
twenty-one vs. eighteen). For forty sentences, the first num-
ber was larger than the second number (e.g., twenty-four vs. 
twenty-one) while the second number in the rest of the sen-
tences was larger than the first one (e.g., twenty-one vs. 
twenty-four). 
Two stimulus lists were created in order to counterbal-
ance the sentences across the biased and unbiased condition. 
Each list consisted of 80 sentences. Forty sentences were as-
signed to the biased condition and forty sentences were as-
signed to the unbiased condition. The sentences assigned to 
the biased condition in one list were assigned to the unbi-
ased condition in the other list and vice versa. In each list 
the biased and unbiased conditions were equated for (a) the 
number of sentences containing two-digit numbers and 
three-digit numbers, (b) the numerical distance between the 
two numbers in each sentence, (c) the number of sentences 
containing within-decade comparisons and between-decade 
comparisons and, (d) the number of sentences in which the 
first number was larger (all ps > .05). 
The experimental sentences were randomized within 
lists; all sentences appeared only once on each list and each 
participant saw only one list. A short practice list preceded 
the experimental trials. This list was constructed from a dif-
ferent set of eight sentences. 
Two versions of each sentence were composed one for 
the biased condition and one for the unbiased condition (see 
Table 1 for additional examples). The unbiased sentences 
(e.g., “The copper bracelet costs one hundred and fifty eight euros while 
the tin bracelet costs one hundred and sixty six euros”) described 
situations in which the participants’ world knowledge did 
not determine what was larger, shorter, bigger, expensive, 
etc. (e.g., there is no bias to think that something made of 
copper is more expensive than something made of tin and 
vice versa). The biased sentences were composed by chang-
ing the unbiased sentences (e.g., “The copper bracelet costs one 
hundred and fifty eight euros while the gold bracelet costs one hundred 
and sixty six euros”) so now the participants’ world knowledge 
oriented to a specific senten- 
 
Table 1. Examples of Material Used in the Study. 
 Unbiased Sentences Biased Sentences 
Example 1 
Sentence “Alfonso consumed 18 grams of alcohol drinking 
brandy and 11 grams of alcohol drinking vodka.” 
“Alfonso consumed 18 grams of alcohol drinking 
brandy and 11 grams of alcohol drinking wine.” 
Comprehension question He consumed more alcohol drinking: He consumed more alcohol drinking: 
Response choices “brandy” (True) “vodka” (False) “brandy” (True) “wine” (False) 
Example 2 
Sentence “Portuguese people eat every year forty eight pizzas on 
average while Greek people eat forty six pizzas.” 
“Italian people eat every year forty eight pizzas on aver-
age while Greek people eat forty six pizzas.” 
Comprehension question People eat more pizza in: People eat more pizza in: 
Response choices “Portugal” (True) “Greece” (False) “Italy” (True) “Greece” (False) 
Note. The material was presented in Spanish (the approximated English translation is reported here). 
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ce interpretation (e.g., people tend to think that something 
made of gold is more expensive than something made of 
copper). In the biased sentences, the participants’ prior 
knowledge supported the literal meaning of the sentences 
(i.e., the outcome of comparing the two numbers embedded 
in the sentences). 
In order to control that biased sentences were really in-
fluenced by the participants’ world knowledge as compared 
to the unbiased sentences, we conducted a normative study. 
Before performing the current experiment, the eighty sen-
tences were presented to twenty participants from the same 
pool that those participating in the experiment (these par-
ticipants did not take part in the experiment). They were 
asked to read clauses indicating the frequency, probability, 
quantity, etc., of something (e.g., the price of something) 
and then they rated three words (e.g., gold, copper, tin) ac-
cording to the given dimension. The ratings ranged from 1 
to 10, graded from less to more in the dimension. The rated 
words were those used to compose the biased and unbiased 
sentences. The results indicated that for a specific dimen-
sion, words used in biased sentences were rated higher (9.04, 
SD = 0.54) than words used in unbiased sentences (4.19, SD 




The experiment was controlled by a Genuine-Intel com-
patible 2993 MHz PC using E-prime experimental software, 
1.1 version (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Par-
ticipants were tested individually. They were seated ap-
proximately 60 cm from the computer screen. Stimuli were 
presented in lower-case black letters (Courier New font, 48 
point size) on a white background. At this viewing distance, 
one character subtended a vertical visual angle of 1.91 de-
grees and a horizontal visual angle of 1.67 degrees. 
Each trial started with a sentence presented in the mid-
dle of the screen. Participants had to read the sentence. They 
were encouraged to read at a normal reading rate. Right after 
finishing the reading, the participants pressed the space bar 
and a comprehension question appeared in the middle of the 
screen followed by two response choices centred on the 
middle of the screen, one on the right side and the other on 
the left side. Participants decided which response (right/left) 
was correct by pressing the required key (m/z), respectively. 
Accuracy on the button-press responses was encouraged 
over speed. The response choices remained on the screen 
until the participant’s response and, after an inter-stimulus 
interval of 1000 ms the experiment continued with the next 
trial.  
In half of biased sentences and half of unbiased sen-
tences the correct response was on the right side while in the 
rest of trials the correct response was on the left side. The 
location of the correct response for each sentence was coun-




The mean accuracy in the sentence comprehension task was 
87.1%. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried out on 
the mean percentage of correct responses by participants 
(F1) and items (F2) with Number format (Arabic digits vs. 
number words) as a between-subjects (within-items) variable 
and Prior knowledge (biased vs. unbiased sentences) as a 
within-subjects (between-items) variable.  
In order to deal with a possible problem of unequal vari-
ance across experimental conditions, mean proportions of 
correct responses for each participant in each experimental 
condition were computed and analyses were performed with 
the arcsine transformation of these values. The main effect 
of number format was significant by participants, F1(1, 62) = 
17.41, p < .001, and items, F2(1, 79) = 19.89, p < .001. The 
main effect of prior knowledge was significant by partici-
pants, F1(1, 62) = 27.20, p < .001, and items, F2(1, 79) = 
4.08, p < .05. Finally, the Number format x Prior knowledge 
interaction was not significant by participants or items, F1 

























Figure 1. Percentage of correct responses obtained in the sentence compre-
hension task as a function of Prior knowledge (unbiased sentences vs. biased 
sentences) and Format of numbers in the sentences (Arabic digits vs. num-
ber words). Error bars refer to standard error. 
 
It might be argued that the number of digits of numeri-
cal information embedded in the sentences might determine 
performance, so sentences with three-digit numbers might 
impose more cognitive load relative to sentences with two-
digit numbers. To evaluate this hypothesis, an ANOVA was 
performed with Number format (Arabic digits vs. number 
words), Prior knowledge (biased vs. unbiased sentences) and 
Number of digits (two-digit numbers vs. three-digit num-
bers). The results showed a main effect of number of digits, 
F1(1, 62) = 25.96, p < .001. Sentences with two-digit num-
bers were comprehended more accurately (89.25%, SE = 
0.84) relative to sentences with three-digit numbers (84.79%, 
SE = 0.93). In addition, the only significant interaction in-
cluding number of digits was the Number format x Number 
of digits interaction, F1(1, 62) = 6.86, p < .01. When sen-
tences included Arabic digits, the effect of number of digits 
Numbers and Prior Knowledge in Sentence Comprehension                                                                                            283 
anales de psicología, 2013, vol. 29, nº 1 (enero) 
was marginal, F1(1, 62) = 3.07, p = .08. Comprehension ac-
curacy for sentences with two-digit numbers was 91.22% 
(SE = 1.18) and for sentences with three-digit numbers it 
was 89.49% (SE = 1.31). When numbers were presented as 
number words, sentences with two-digit numbers were 
comprehended more accurately (87.28%, SE = 1.18) relative 
to sentences with three-digit numbers (80.07%, SE = 1.31), 
F1(1, 62) = 29.75, p < .001. Thus, sentences with small 
numbers were associated to a better understanding which 
was more evident when numerical information was pre-
sented in verbal format. 
Finally, we evaluated the possible numerical distance ef-
fect between the two numbers embedded in the sentence. 
To this end, an ANOVA was performed with Number for-
mat (Arabic digits vs. number words), Prior knowledge (bi-
ased vs. unbiased sentences) and Numerical distance (small: 
distance 1, and large: distance 8). The numerical distance 
was not significant, p > .05, and this variable did not interact 
with any other, ps > .05. Thus, comprehension accuracy 




Two empirical questions aimed the current study. Firstly, we 
examined whether sentence comprehension was more accu-
rate when numbers were presented as digits. The answer is 
positive because sentence comprehension was better with 
Arabic digits than with number words. This result extends 
that previously observed when people comprehend numbers 
in isolation (e.g., number comparison task, Macizo & 
Herrera, 2008). There is a large amount of experimental 
work in number cognition demonstrating the existence of a 
common, notation-independent, magnitude representation 
which is accessed irrespective of number format. For in-
stance, the distance effect (i.e., the time to compare two 
numbers is an inverse function of the numerical distance be-
tween them; Moyer & Landauer, 1967) which is carried out 
on internal semantic representations that reflect magnitude 
and quantity relations among numbers, is virtually identical 
for digits and number words (Buckley & Gillman, 1974). In 
addition, there is semantic facilitation in the processing of 
target numbers regardless the format of related numbers 
previously presented (e.g., cross-notational semantic prim-
ing, Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 1998). Thus, 
magnitude information seems to be notation-independent at 
least for symbolic quantities (e.g., digits, number words). 
When differences are found across number formats, they are 
generally ascribable to encoding processes (Nöel & Seron, 
1992)1. The encoding differences between digits and number 
words might be determined by the frequency of occurrence 
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on this topic). 
of numbers in these two formats (Hurford, 1987) and/or by 
the number of processing stages needed to access magnitude 
information. McCloskey and Macaruso (1995), indicated that 
comprehension of alphabetic written number words in-
volves (a) identification of individual letters, (b) identifica-
tion of the word as a whole, and (c) retrieval of the word’s 
meaning; whereas the comprehension of logographic digits 
involves (a) identification of the digit and (b) retrieval of the 
digit’s meaning. The additional processing stage in verbal 
number processing might produce weaker semantic activa-
tion as compared to the processing of Arabic digits. This 
possible explanation remains to be explored in future re-
search. In any case, the results of the present study indicate 
that encoding differences in the processing of digits and 
verbal numbers exert an influence beyond that level such as 
sentence comprehension. 
The second question of the present study was to evaluate 
whether comprehension of sentences that contain numerical 
information would benefit from the introduction of world 
knowledge. Previous studies have observed that reading 
comprehension relay on rich prior knowledge about real life 
and that its use enhances readers’ comprehension (e.g., 
Kintsch & Franzke, 1995). The present study demonstrates 
that the benefit associated to the use of prior knowledge in 
reading comprehension extends to the case of magnitude in-
formation. 
It might be argued that participants used their prior 
knowledge about quantities (what is usually larger, bigger, 
etc. in the world) to create shallow representations which 
lead them to comprehend correctly the biased sentences (the 
good-enough approach; Ferreira, Ferraro, & Bailey, 2002; 
Patson, Darowski, Moon, & Ferreira, 2009). Ferreira and 
colleagues argue that semantic representations of sentences 
are sometimes not complete, detailed and accurate but they 
are shallow representations that generally suffice to perform 
a comprehension task. For example, when asked “how many 
animals of each sort did Moses put in the ark?” people tend 
to respond “two” without noticing that it was Noah who put 
the animals in the ark instead of Moses (the Moses illusion, 
Erickson & Mattson, 1981). The Moses illusion suggests that 
readers’ comprehension can be quite shallow but well 
enough to know what they are been asked. These shallow 
representations directly refer to heuristics or “short-cuts” 
that readers use to correctly understand sentences in absence 
of a full lexical and syntactic processing (Ferreira, 2003). In 
the biased condition of the current study, world knowledge 
about quantities and literal number information oriented to 
the same sentence interpretation. Therefore, it might be pos-
sible that participants created sentence meanings based on 
their prior knowledge only because it was good enough to 
perform the comprehension task without processing deeply 
the numerical information. An indirect source of evidence 
for this tentative explanation comes from studies in which 
lexical effects typically found with single words (e.g., repeti-
tion effect, associative priming, etc.) disappear or become 
weaker when these words are embedded in sentences (see 
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Ledoux, Camblin, Swaab, & Gordon, 2006, for a review). 
However, this hypothesis might predict no differences based 
on the numerical format of quantities embedded in biased 
sentences. Thus, if participants relied more on prior knowl-
edge than on number processing to comprehend biased sen-
tences the effect of numerical format might be attenuated. 
On the contrary, sentences were better understood with dig-
its than with number words in both biased and unbiased 
sentences. In addition, although the results of this experi-
ment indicated that participants benefited from the use of 
prior knowledge, this knowledge did not suffice to compre-
hend unbiased sentences. Therefore, participants might be 
using both world knowledge and numerical information to 
comprehend the sentences in the current study. Further re-
search is needed to explore deeply this question in the con-
text of number processing and the use of world knowledge 
during sentence understanding. 
To conclude, the present study shows that comprehen-
sion of numerical information in sentence context is en-
hanced by using Arabic digits and by connecting informa-
tion with people’s prior knowledge. 
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